Afghanistan and Ukraine are very different conflicts, but we must still learn from our previous failures. Just as we made a moral and strategic error rushing out of Afghanistan, it would be a terrible mistake to withdraw support for Ukraine while Russian aggression continues. It will make Russia Europe’s dominant military power and undermine liberal democracy. To avoid this, NATO allies need to stay the course, argues Laurie Bristow. The article is based on Bristow's experiences as Ambassador to Afghanistan, where he was the last man on the ground when the Taliban invaded. The story is told in his memoir, Kabul: Final Call.

In August 2021, the United States and its allies hastily retreated from Afghanistan. A twenty-year campaign ended with the Taliban back in control. NATO was not militarily defeated. It did not need to be. We failed through lack of will, lack of staying power, and lack of a coherent strategy. We paid a price, in terms of credibility with allies and opponents, and in terms of our national security. It is far less than the price being paid today by Afghans, particularly women and girls.

Is the west about to make the same strategic mistake in Ukraine? The long-delayed decision of the US Congress to agree the USD 61bn assistance package for Ukraine has bought some time. But there is no prospect of Putin ceasing his war of aggression, and no prospect of a negotiated peace, as long as he thinks he can achieve his aims through military force. With US presidential elections in November, and no end to the war in sight, the risk is that we are about to see a similar failure of strategy and staying power in a conflict that is much closer to home, with much bigger consequences for us.

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With US presidential elections in November, and no end to the war in sight, the risk is that we are about to see a similar failure of strategy and staying power in a conflict that is much closer to home, with much bigger consequences for us.

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There are important differences. NATO is not a direct participant in the war in Ukraine, and it is in everyone’s interests for this not to become a direct Russia-NATO confrontation – Russia’s included. Russia – the owner of the world’s largest nuclear arsenal and what was previously thought to be one of the world’s most capable armies – is not the Taliban. Ukraine – a European country that aspires to be a member of the EU and NATO – is very different from Afghanistan.

Yet the similarities should trouble us. Our failure in Afghanistan was not one of capability but of strategy and will. We failed for 20 years to create the conditions to safely withdraw our military support to the Afghan government. But we did so anyway, under the terms of Trump’s February 2020 Doha Agreement with the Taliban. It was clear even as the military withdrawal was still taking place that it would end badly, yet we pressed ahead, with the results that we saw unfold in the humiliating evacuation from Kabul of August 2021.

That is not an argument for an indefinite military commitment to Afghanistan, nor that the underlying problems in Afghanistan could be solved by military force alone. Because there was no viable strategy for a political resolution and therefore none for a military withdrawal, the war dragged on; politicians and voters on both sides of the Atlantic lost patience.

But Trump’s Doha Agreement was not  a serious attempt to find a political settlement involving the Taliban. If it had been, it would surely qualify for the title of worst deal in history. It reflected a determination to walk away from the problem, regardless of the consequences. We should bear that in mind when Trump says that he would end the war in Ukraine in an afternoon.

The USD 61bn assistance package for Ukraine was stuck  in Congress for the best part of six months,  a hostage to pre-election posturing and  a view among the MAGA Republicans that Putin’s war against Ukraine does not engage fundamental US interests. Both rest on a failure to grasp what is at stake. During that time, Ukraine’s position on the battlefield and in any future negotiation weakened. As a result, the security of the United States and of Europe is at greater risk.

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Strategic illiteracy takes many forms. First, the idea that a negotiated solution to Russia’s war against Ukraine is available now. It’s wishful thinking. Putin’s goals have not changed, and there is no reason for them to change while he believes that the tide is turning in his favour. In case we needed reminding, he set out his goals clearly and repeatedly in recent months. Any negotiation, in Putin’s mind, would essentially be about the terms of Ukraine’s surrender and about a fundamental change in the balance of power between Russia, and the United States and Europe.

A negotiated outcome is only possible on acceptable terms if the underlying power relationship between Russia, Ukraine and its allies is right. Trump’s Doha deal made it next to impossible to achieve a negotiated outcome in Afghanistan because it handed the Taliban what they wanted – the withdrawal of all foreign forces – up front and at no cost to themselves. We should not repeat that error.

Second, the idea that the war does not engage the United States’ vital interests. Imagine a world where Putin wins. Not necessarily through subjugating all of Ukraine and installing a puppet regime. More likely, through wrecking Ukraine’s infrastructure; bleeding it of people; sapping its capacity and will to build a democratic society; convincing its supporters that Ukraine is a lost cause.

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Trump’s Doha deal made it next to impossible to achieve a negotiated outcome in Afghanistan because it handed the Taliban what they wanted – the withdrawal of all foreign forces – up front and at no cost to themselves. We should not repeat that error.

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Several consequences follow from this. Russia would become the dominant military power in Europe. Putin will have demonstrated that what he wants, he gets. That will not be lost on the United States’ opponents or its allies. Putin’s Russia – hardly a global superpower, more a nasty throwback to fascism – will have achieved what the USSR never achieved: to decouple the security of the United States from that of Europe. Europe will be faced with an unpalatable choice between accommodating Putin’s violent imperialism or containing it, without the underpinning provided by the transatlantic alliance. And finally, Putin will have been proved right when he told the Financial Times in June 2019 that “The liberal idea has become obsolete.  It has come into conflict with the interests of the overwhelming majority of the population”.  The future will belong to men like Vladimir Putin.

Third, the idea that because the bigger, long-term challenge to the west is from China, we should peel Russia away from China by accommodating Putin.There is no prospect of decoupling Putin’s Russia from China. Putin’s war creates unwanted problems for China. But it also creates opportunities if it succeeds. If Russia dominates Europe’s security landscape,that gives great scope for China, acting in concert with Russia, to create tough strategic dilemmas for the United States and its allies in the Asia-Pacific.

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Putin’s Russia – hardly a global superpower, more a nasty throwback to fascism – will have achieved what the USSR never achieved: to decouple the security of the United States from that of Europe.

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It is not in China’s interests for Russia to fail. But China will not want to back a losing proposition. Our goal should be to make it clear to China that Putin is a loser. That will increase the incentives for China to use its leverage on Russia to bring its war against Ukraine to an end.

What can we do? We can start by understanding that this is not a war in a far-off country of which we know little – not for Europeans, not for Americans. Security does not work like that in the modern world. Either we are serious about this or we live with the consequences of our lack of seriousness.

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It means understanding why the transatlantic alliance matters, on both sides of the Atlantic. For the United States it is about the forward defence of US interests, not providing free security for those who don’t want to provide it for themselves. For Europeans, it means taking our own defence seriously. The realisation is dawning among Europeans that they need to increase their own defence spending and capabilities. NATO’s 75th anniversary summit in Washington this July should be a moment for all concerned to demonstrate leadership,  resolve, and clarity of purpose.

It also means not doing Putin’s work for him. Russian propaganda works by mobilising grievances - domestically, and internationally. The situation in Gaza is a monumental grievance ripe for exploitation – in our own societies as well as in the Global South, which sees double standards. This is about us. Putin’s propaganda, when directed at us, works because we let it, because we are willing to be pulled into echo chambers and away from the give and take of living in a pluralistic society.

We all need to step up now. Putin is gearing up for a summer offensive. If we do not support Ukraine in the coming weeks, we and they may have to live with the consequences for a long time. Including the perception that the United States and its allies do not have the will to protect their interests or the values they espouse against adversaries.

The warning lights are flashing red.

Laurie Bristow was the UK Ambassador to Afghanistan during the fall of Kabul in 2021, and was previously the UK Ambassador to Russia in 2016-2020.